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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the impact of differences in supply of and demand for private eq-
uity financing on the performance of buyouts. Using a unique and proprietary sample of 
684 buyout investments in North America and Europe, we show that buyout perform-
ance  
(a) decreases when large volumes of private equity commitments are looking for suit-
able acquisition targets and (b) increases when macroeconomic conditions are such that 
demand for private equity financing is high. These findings remain unchanged if we 
control for the idiosyncrasies of individual investment periods, transaction size, holding 
period and industry sector of individual investment and the vintage year, the size or the 
age of the investing private equity fund. Our results support the view that the market for 
buyout target companies is not necessarily efficient, but that instead acquisition prices 
(and thereby transaction performance) depend on the competition by a limited number 
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1 Introduction 
The market for buyout1 investments is characterized by a great degree of illiquidity, 
sticky capital commitments and substantial variance in the supply of and demand for 
buyout capital over time. This raises the question of whether this market is efficient, in 
the sense that exogenous shocks causing shifts in demand and supply  have no impact 
on security pricing
2, or whether we observe price pressure effects (Scholes, 1972) in the 
sense that acquisition prices (and thereby transaction performance) depend on the 
competitive conditions in the market for buyout capital. 
This paper analyzes the existence of price pressure effects in the buyout industry. It thus 
follows a number of studies looking at price pressure effects in various other empirical 
settings
3, the majority of which supports the existence of price pressure effects in the 
short-run. Most closely related to this paper, Gompers and Lerner coined the term 
"money chasing deals phenomenon" for their finding that too much money chasing too 
few deals in the venture capital (VC) industry increases acquisition prices for venture 
capital participations (Gompers and Lerner, 2000). 
The present study constitutes the first analysis of the impact of price pressure effects on 
risk-adjusted buyout performance at the level of the individual transaction. It links risk-
adjusted transaction performance to various measures of the competitive conditions in 
                                                 
1 In the literature buyout transactions are variously labeled (e.g., leveraged buyout, management buyout, institutional 
buyout, management buyin, etc.) and often used synonymously. In this paper the term "buyout" as being the broadest 
is preferred which comprises the different facets of this transaction type. 
2 Rf. for example Fama, 1970 or Fama, 1991 for an exhaustive discussion of existing theoretical and empirical re-
search on the efficiency of financial markets. 
3 For public companies rf. for example Shleifer, 2000; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002; Harris and Gurel, 1986; 
Shleifer, 1986; Dhillon and Johnson, 1991; Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997 and Goetzmann, 1986; for private compa-
nies rf. Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Gompers and Lerner, 2004 and Kaplan and Stein, 1993. 
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the market for buyout financing, while controlling for several alternative performance 
determinants at the fund-level and at the deal-level.  
The corresponding empirical analysis was possible thanks to a unique and proprietary 
comprehensive dataset on thousands of North American and European buyouts entered 
between 1981 and 2003. Based on this data we calculate a profitability index that 
assesses the risk-adjusted return to investors relative to the performance of public 
market investments in the same geographic region and in the same industry sector for 
each deal. This approach is still novel in buyout research, as limited data availability 
has restricted most prior work to the use of fund-level performance or on performance 
measures that are not adjusted for risk.  
We model risk-adjusted buyout performance as influenced by three proxies for the 
demand for buyout  capital and by one proxy for the supply of buyout capital. We 
further control for the impact of (a) fund and investment size, (b) holding period, (c) 
particularities of transactions made during the time of the “new economy” boom and (d) 
the particularities of deals made in the first year of a fund’s life.  
The results of our ordinary least squares (OLS) regression provide general support for 
the price pressure effect hypothesis in the buyout market. Not only do our findings 
show a significant and negative performance-impact of increasing supply of buyout 
funding (the money chasing deals phenomenon), but also the corresponding significant 
and positive performance-impact of increasing demand for buyout financing (deals 
chasing money).  
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These findings remain qualitatively unchanged if we include additional control 
variables to capture the effect of (a) idiosyncratic characteristics of individual 
investment periods, (b) industry sector of individual investment and (c) the age of the 
investing private equity fund. It is further noteworthy that the performance of North 
American buyouts is not as much influenced by changes in supply as it is the case for 
their European counterparts. This is consistent with the view that the North American 
buyout market is more mature, and thus efficient, than the European market buyout 
market. 
This paper is structured into 6 chapters. Chapter 2 gives background information and 
shows the relevance of our research question from the standpoint of both theory and 
practice. Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the theoretical foundations of 
argument. Chapter 4 describes the analyzed dataset. Chapter 5 presents the empirical 
analyses and the results. Chapter 6 discusses the implications of our findings and 
concludes the paper. 
2 Background 
Buyout investments represent one investment class within the Private Equity (PE) asset 
category. This category is characterized by a specific governance structure based on the 
relationship between institutional investors and an intermediary (the PE fund). A PE 
fund is usually structured as a limited liability partnership, and is comprised of a 
management team (the general partner, GP), which manages the investments of the 
limited partner (LP). The PE fund's investors hold shares of the limited partnership. 
Specialized buyout funds invest in companies that are in later stages of their lifecycle. 
Subsequent to the transactions the target companies’ shares are not publicly traded. 
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Additionally, but usually in smaller portions than the institutional investors, the target 
company’s management team, its employees or new external managers can subscribe 
for equity stakes.4
This special type of corporate acquisition has received increasing attention over the last 
decades from both the investor and academic community. This is primarily due to the 
steep increase in fund inflows into this asset class, which led to a rise in both the 
average size and the annual number of newly raised funds. 
Buyouts already existed in the 1970s, but first evolved into a phenomenon of economic 
relevance during the 1980s in the United States. In the period between 1979 and 1989 
more than 2.000 buyouts were conducted with a total transaction value of above 250 
billion USD (Opler and Titman, 1993). Until today, the largest buyout ever was the 
acquisition of RJR Nabisco by the PE Firm Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts (KKR) in 1989 
with a transaction value of 29 billion USD (Dammon et al., 1993; SDC Platinum). The 
first boom of the buyout market with the corresponding increase in the capital inflow 
into buyout funds was stopped by the breakdown of the high yield bond market in 1990. 
High yield bonds were typically used to provide debt financing for the highly leveraged 
transactions of this period. The buyout segment gained importance again during the 
1990s, not only in the US, but also in Europe, where the buyout market became sizable 
for the first time. Until today, the peak of buyout activity was the period from 1998 to 
2000 during which more than 700 new buyout fund were raised (VentureXpert). 
                                                 
4 A comprehensive overview of buyouts, venture capital, private equity in general, and typical transaction character-
istics is given by: Lowenstein, 1985; Sahlman and Stevenson, 1985; Wright and Coyne, 1985; Jensen, 1986; Smith, 
1986, Jensen, 1989a; Jensen, 1989b; Kaplan, 1989a; Kaplan, 1989b; Kaplan and Stein, 1993; Lichtenberg and Sie-
gel, 1990; Sahlman, 1990; Kaplan, 1991; Gompers, 1996; Black and Gilson, 1998; Wright and Robbie, 1998; 
Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Cotter and Peck, 2001; Berg and Gottschalg, 2005. 
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In parallel to the increasing interest of the investor community, more and more 
academic research has looked at different facets of the buyout phenomenon.5 Despite 
these research efforts one could argue that to-date the buyout market still remains 
‘under-researched’ relative to its economic importance and compared to the exhaustive 
research conducted on other asset classes, such as for example mutual funds. One key 
reason for the lack of quantitative research on buyouts is the general difficulties to 
obtain access to information on relevance variables, such as the characteristics of 
individual investments or transaction performance. 
Within the field of buyout research, studying price pressure effects is of particular 
interest as both the supply of and the demand for buyout funding is very cyclical. In the 
last years, there has been consistently more capital flowing into buyout funds, than has 
been invested by them. A cumulative capital inflow into buyouts funds of 260 million 
USD between 1998 and 2000 substantially surpasses the aggregate buyout funds 
investments of 100 billion USD over the same time period.  The corresponding 
‘overhang’ in available capital in buyout funds did not decrease over the following 
years either. 
The cyclical inflow in buyout funds leads to direct changes in the supply of funding for 
buyout investments. This is caused by the structure of buyout funds, which are mostly 
closed-end investment funds with an investment horizon of 10 years. The fund manager 
is thus obligated to invest the capital committed by the investors within this period of 
                                                 
5 Rf. Berg and Gottschalg, 2005 for a comprehensive overview over the literature on value generation in buyouts. 
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time. High fund inflows together with the closed fund structure lead to competition 
among fund managers for suitable acquisition targets.  
Similarly, the determinants of how many buyout target companies are available at any 
point in time vary substantially. The demand for buyout financing can be expected to be 
influenced by several macroeconomic factors. As buyouts are part of the overall M&A 
market, one would assume, for example, that the number of available buyout targets 
correlates with the size of the M&A market. Furthermore, the firms’ need for external 
financing may influence their tendency to seek buyout funding, be it through a buyout 
of the entire firm or the divestiture of an individual division through a spin-off buyout. 
Finally, there may be a trend over time in the sense that buyout financing became 
increasingly accepted in the investor community and that thereby the share of overall 
takeover candidates that are available for buyout financing has increased. 
Hence the competitive conditions in the market for buyout financing vary according to 
fluctuations on both the demand and the supply side. This paper studies whether this 
competition for a limited amount of deals causes price pressure leading to higher prices 
for acquisition targets and thus to lower return to investors.  
3  Theoretical considerations  
The question of whether changes in the supply of and demand for buyout funding 
influence acquisition prices for buyouts and thereby the performance of these 
investments is inherently linked to the more fundamental theoretical question of 
whether and under what circumstances financial markets are efficient in the pricing of 
investment opportunities or whether one observes price pressure effects. 
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The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is one of the central premises in finance 
theory. It claims that security prices fully reflect all available information at all times 
(Fama, 1970). Demand being perfectly elastic, exogenous supply or demand shifts then 
do not lead to a change in market price. Independent of demand for or supply of a 
security, a market price exists for each security which reflects the available information 
about expected risk and return of the security (Shleifer, 1986 and Scholes, 1972). If 
markets are efficient, an increased capital inflow into buyout funds and the 
corresponding increase in the supply of buyout financing should thus not result in 
increased prices or lower returns of buyouts. The EMH assumes that every security can 
be substituted by another security or a combination of securities.
6
While buyouts differ from public securities
 analyzed in prior research on  price pressure 
effects (Harris and Gurel, 1986, Shleifer, 2000 und Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002 
among others) in many respects, the following analogy can be made. Many buyouts 
companies have close substitutes among public companies and sometimes even used to 
be publicly traded themselves prior to the buyout. Furthermore, the absolute amount of 
capital inflow into buyout funds is still small compared to the overall capitalization of 
public equity markets.
7 Hence there are reasons to believe that, as long as the shocks to 
supply and demand are exogenous, neither expected risk nor return of the security 
should be affected by variations in supply and demand. Following the reasoning of the 
EMH, changes in supply of and demand for buyout funding should therefore have no 
impact on the pricing and performance of buyouts. 
                                                 
6 Rf. Modigliani and Miller, 1958 and Miller and Modigliani, 1961. 
7 Rf. Gompers and Lerner, 2000 for the analogy with the Venture Capital industry. 
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An important counterargument to the EMH comes from behavioral finance theory that 
considers the possibility of systematic and significant deviations from the market price 
under certain conditions.
8 Of those conditions, the price pressure effect is of particular  
relevance to this paper (Scholes, 1972). From the perspective of behavioral finance 
theory, an exogenous shock in supply or demand for a security leads to a short-term 
change in the price for this security. For example, an exogenous increase in the capital 
inflow into a certain asset class that does not reflect changed expectations regarding risk 
or return for corresponding securities will lead to an over-supply of capital seeking to 
purchase this security and thus to a short-term increase of the market price. As this price 
increase is only short-term, the risk-adjusted return to the investors during this short 
period is low relative to other securities. This holds true when every security can be 
regarded as unique in the sense that it cannot be fully substituted through other 
securities (Durand, 1959). 
This paper analyzes the existence of price pressure on buyout pricing over the period 
1981 to 2003 for European and American buyouts. It complements empirical work on 
index admission of public companies (Harris and Gurel, 1986; Shleifer, 1986; Dhillon 
and Johnson, 1991 and Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997), fund inflows into open 
investment funds (Warther, 1995 and Wermers, 1999), share buybacks (Davidson III 
and Chhachhi, 1996; Masulis, 1980; Dann, 1981; Vermaelen, 1981 and Davidson III 
and Garrison, 1989), block trades (Dann et al., 1977 and Kraus and Stoll, 1972) and 
Venture Capital (Gompers and Lerner, 2000).  
                                                 
8 For an overview rf. Shleifer, 2000, for an example rf. Black, 1986. 
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Large scale empirical studies on price pressure effects in the context of private 
companies are limited due to previously discussed data restrictions. One noteworthy 
exception is the work of Gompers and Lerner (Gompers and Lerner, 2000). They 
analyze the impact of Venture Capital fund inflow on venture evaluations and find that 
inflows into venture funds increase the valuation of these funds' new investments. The 
phenomenon that they call "money chasing deals" is consistent with the theory that 
competition for a limited number of attractive investments leads to rising prices for 
venture investments. 
Ljungqvist and Richardson and Diller and Kaserer conduct similar analyses in the 
context of the overall private equity industry (Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003 and 
Diller and Kaserer, 2005). Both studies provide first evidence that change in demand 
and supply influences returns of the private equity industry, including the buyout 
segment. Diller and Kaserer conduct analyses on the funds-level and look at the impact 
of fund inflows, skilled PE companies and risk on the performance of private equity 
funds (Diller and Kaserer, 2005). They show that fund inflows affect fund performance 
as one would expect according to the behavioral finance theory. The focus of the work 
of Ljungqvist and Richardson is on fund level as well and their findings are consistent 
with the price pressure effect hypothesis (Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003). They also 
provide first indications on the impact of supply and demand on deal-level performance, 
but as the authors acknowledge, data limitations restrict them from calculating accurate 
performance measures at the deal level and more precise operationalizations for supply 
and demand. 
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4  Dataset and sample composition 
4.1 Overview 
Difficulties in obtaining relevant information in sufficient depth and breadth for a 
comprehensive statistical analysis have traditionally been an obstacle to large-scale 
empirical research in the private equity industry. Insufficient data transparency and data 
availability is primarily caused by the nature of a segment of financial markets that calls 
itself the private equity industry and in which the publication of acquisition and selling 
prices are uncommon. Most investments are entirely private transactions where no 
disclosure requirements exist. This paper is unique in the way that it uses an exhaustive 
proprietary data set with comprehensive information on the 684 investments of 170 
buyout funds raised between 1977 and 2000 with a total committed volume of 70 billion 
USD. 
This database has been composed based on information that have been made available 
from either the buyout fund managers (General Partners) directly and through 
collaborations with large institutional investors in buyout funds. These so-called 
Limited Partners (typically pension funds, large financial institutions, specialized fund-
of-fund investors) in the Limited Liability Partnerships provide capital to buyout funds 
and collect a large amount of information on buyout funds in the context of due 
diligence processes. Our research partners are among the world's largest investors in 
private equity funds and collectively manage commitments in excess of USD 40 billion. 
Each of these institutions screens several hundred newly raised buyout funds each year 
during their due diligence process. 
   13
Most of our information on buyout funds and investments has been extracted from 
offering documents (the so-called Private Placement Memorandum – PPM), in which 
private equity fund managers describe their previous transactions for fund-raising 
purposes. PPMs are submitted by the General Partner to potential investors and used by 
these to assess the quality and strategy of the General Partner. Typically, PPMs contain 
information about the complete “track record”, i.e. a chronological list of all buyout 
investments with individual transactions details and deal-level performance. Because 
PPMs are confidential they have rarely been used in academic research so far. In our 
case, all data had to be “sanitized”, i.e. the names of General Partners, Limited Partners 
and portfolio companies have been replaced by numeric codes prior to being entered in 
our database. The data about buyout transactions used for this paper are the acquisition 
and sales date and price, the status of investment (realized or unrealized) as well as 
general information about buyout companies' location and industry affiliation.  Relevant 
information about the investing buyout funds include the year in which the fund was 
raised (the so-called vintage years), the amount of capital committed to the fund and the 
fund's geographic investment focus.  
The data contained in this proprietary database has been complemented with 
information contained in commercially available data sources about the buyout industry 
(Thomson Financial VentureXpert) and general financial market information (SDC 
Platinum). In particular; this additional data includes the total amount of capital raised 
by all buyout funds in a given year and the corresponding aggregate yearly investments 
of all buyout funds. This data source, Thomson Financial VentureXpert, has been used 
extensively in prior research (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Gottschalg et al., 2004 and 
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Diller and Kaserer, 2005) and is regarded as a representative database for the entire 
buyout universe by academics and practitioners alike.  
4.2 Sample  description 
To derive a suitable sample of buyouts from the overall PPM database, we looked at the 
2274 buyouts made by 170 buyout funds in the database and excluded all transactions 
with at least one of the following characteristics:  
•  Unrealized buyouts: The database includes buyouts that are still unrealized. 
Unrealized in this context means that a PE Firm acquires a company, but has not 
sold it yet. As no pricing takes place for these portfolio companies, 
determination of a reliable performance measure is not possible and thus the 
buyout has to be excluded from our analysis. 
•  Incomplete information: Due to the inevitable heterogeneity of the data source 
for the database (there is no standard format for PPMs), sufficient data to 
conduct the analyses are not available for all buyouts. We therefore only 
consider transactions for which information on the investment amount, 
acquisition and exit date, performance, the location, and the industry affiliation 
of the buyout were available. 
•  Out-of-Scope: The sample is restricted to European and American buyouts 
between 1981 and 2004. All other buyouts were excluded from the analysis. 
Based on these criteria, we obtain a sample of 684 buyouts for which all required 
information is available from the proprietary PPM database. These 684 buyouts have 
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been made by 170 buyout funds. Table 1 shows that approximately one quarter of the 
funds has a European investment focus. Only a small fraction (approximately 5%) of 
each fund's investments is outside its geographic investment focus. The smallest fund 
has a committed fund volume of 5 million and the largest of 5.7 billion USD. The 
median size of European funds in the sample is above the median of American funds. 
<<< Insert table 1 >>> 
Three quarters of the buyouts in the sample were North American companies. This ratio 
is approximately the same for the total amount of equity invested, which implies that 
deal sizes are about the same on average in both regions. The average (median) buyout 
has an equity investment of 23 (11) million USD. The largest buyout of the sample with 
an equity investment of 535 million USD was conducted in Europe. 
<<< Insert table 2 >>> 
The company's industry affiliation has been codified according to the DataStream 
classification (level 4) based on the information made available by our research 
partners. The largest industry class of buyouts in this sample is cyclical services, which 
includes among others retail, hotels, media and entertainment as well as transport 
services. Further, a high number of buyouts were conducted in information technology 
and non-cyclical consumer goods. 
>>> Insert table 3 <<< 
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4.3 Sample  representativeness 
As buyout investments are confidential and information on even basic characteristics of 
the overall population is not publicly available, it is difficult to assess how 
representative this sample is. One possibility to nevertheless gain some insights into 
sample representativeness, is to compare our sample to the largest and most 
comprehensive commercially available database on buyout funds (Kaplan and Schoar, 
2005). This database (VentureXpert) is managed by Thomson Financial Venture 
Economics and provides aggregate performance information on approximately 800 US 
and European buyout funds. In the following differences between our sample and 
VentureXpert funds are analyzed. 
The average fund size of our sample (422 million USD) is slightly larger than the 
average size funds raised over the same time period according to VentureXpert (372 
million USD) though differences in means are not statistically different at conventional 
levels (F-value of 0.046 for different variances and t-value of -0.862 for different 
means). The share of funds with investment focus on North America relative to Europe 
is also not different at conventional levels. In our sample, 77% of the funds focus on 
North American investments while 72% of the funds in VentureXpert do. 
There exists however a significant difference in mean fund performance (p < 5%). The 
average (median) performance of the funds in our sample is 29.0% (16.7%) as 
compared to 17.2% (12.7%) for the VentureXpert database. This upward bias of our 
sample could be result of one or several of the following factors. First, one has to 
suspect some form of survivorship bias inherent in our research design, as we can 
assume that only PE Firms that were reasonably successful with their first fund send a 
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PPM to raise money for a subsequent fund. The worst performing buyout associations 
will thus be excluded from our sample. Furthermore, we need to consider that PPMs are 
marketing instruments and that some bias may arise from the self-reported nature of 
information they contain. Finally, there may be some level of selection bias, as our 
research partners do not necessarily receive all PPMs and we only received a (random) 
subset of their data. This upward bias however, has only limited consequences, as the 
objective of this study is to explain the performance impact of supply and demand 
variation, rather than to assess the overall average returns to this investment category. 
As there is little reason to believe that the upward bias in our sample has a systematic 
influence on the price pressure effect for buyout investments, this finding should not a 
priori limit the generalizability of our results. 
5 Empirical  analyses 
This paper analyzes the impact of supply and demand for buyout capital on the return to 
the buyout investors.  Drawing on price pressure theory, it predicts that an increase in 
the supply of buyout capital will lead to higher prices. Along the same lines, it also 
predicts that an increase in demand for buyout capital will lead to a price decrease. 
Consequently buyout companies acquired in the years with high supply are expected to 
have ceteris paribus a lower return to investors ("money chasing deals") while years 
with high demand are expected to have ceteris paribus a higher return ("deals chasing 
money"). 
In the following, measurement and operationalization of the variables to test these 
hypotheses are described and the results of the empirical analysis along with several 
assess are presented. 
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5.1  Operationalization and measurement of independent variables 
Supply of capital available for buyout investments is approximated by the total amount 
of money available to all buyout funds that are active in a given region at a given point 
in time. The accurate assessment of this variable is challenging as it requires the 
consideration of cumulative capital commitments to and investments by buyout funds 
over long time.  
Prior research (Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003  and Diller and Kaserer, 2005) has 
simply used capital inflows into buyout funds in a given year as a proxy for the relevant 
supply of buyout capital in this year. However fund commitments are invested over the 
entire life of the funds (usually 10 years) so that funds from several vintage years 
compete for acquisition targets in any given year. Consequently this approximation can 
be misleading, particularly if one year with very low capital inflows follows a year with 
high capital inflows. By only looking at same-year capital inflows, the following year 
would be treated as low demand although the capital from the prior year has not been 
fully invested yet but is still "chasing deals" as well. 
In contrast to existing research, we therefore operationalize supply of buyout financing 
through a variable that more accurately captures the overall stock of capital available to 
all active buyout funds. The corresponding variable capital overhang considers not only 
capital inflows, but also the past investments done by these funds. This is possible 
thanks to our cooperation with the Venture Economics division of Thomson Financial, 
which provided detailed information on fund commitments and investments over the 
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fund life.9 This information is critical in determining the capital available (the buyout 
capital supply). The capital overhang is determined by the committed capital to all 
funds raised in the and prior to the year of the respective buyout lowered by the amount 
that was already invested at the date of the regarded acquisition. To avoid that 
committed capital that the fund managers returned to the investors is no longer included 
as capital supply, capital that was not invested by a fund after 10 years, is excluded 
from the calculations. 
Further, capital supply needs to be differentiated among the funds' focus on different 
maturity and geography of companies. We only consider private equity funds with an 
explicit focus on buyout investments for the calculation of buyout capital overhang. 
Funds that are primarily investing in venture capital or real estate are not included.  To 
consider the regional specialization of most buyout funds, we differentiate between 
funds with an investments focus on North America and those with an investment focus 
on Europe. The capital overhang is determined on this level as competition for a 
European buyout (for example) primarily stems from funds with investment focus on 
Europe. Capital overhang is determined as a log function per year in 1995 USD 
allowing comparability between the years. In our (unreported) robustness checks we 
used alternative operationalizations of this variable in terms of (a) the treatment of fund 
commitments prior to the investment year and (b) the treatment of the geographic fund 
focus but all findings remained qualitatively unchanged. 
                                                 
9 The authors would like to thank Gemma Postlethwaite and Jesse Reyes from Thomson Venture Economics for 
providing generous access to their data. 
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The demand for buyout capital is measured along three dimensions. The first one 
captures the availability of acquisition targets based on the number of owners currently 
selling their companies, the second one considers the tendency of companies to look for 
external financing sources and the third approximates the general acceptance of buyouts 
as a mean of financing. 
The demand of owners selling their companies is operationalized by the actual level of 
M&A activity. M&A activity includes the divestiture of subsidiaries of large 
corporations as well as the sale of entire companies by their current owners. M&A 
volumes are drawn from the SDC Platinum database as the aggregate enterprise value 
(including net debt) of all transactions in a given period and region. To measure the 
demand of owners selling their companies more accurately, quarterly M&A volumes 
per region (Europe and North America) in 1995 USD are used. 
As a second proxy for the demand for buyout financing we consider the companies’ 
investment opportunities and the corresponding need for external financing (debt or 
equity). This factor is operationalized through the Tobin Q. This proxy has been widely 
used in prior studies (Brainard and Tobin, 1968; Tobin, 1969 and Tobin, 1978). A 
higher value for Q stands for more investment opportunity (e.g. Lindenberg and Ross, 
1981). We follow the Chung and Pruitt approximation to determine Tobin’s Q10 as 
follows (Chung and Pruitt, 1994): 
  Q (approximation) = (MVE + PS + DEBT)/TA 
                                                 
10 In comparison to more sophisticated means of calculations, Chung and Pruitt, 1994 prove that their approximation 
equals at least 96.6% of the exact calculation. 
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MVE represents the market capitalization, PS the liquidation value of quoted preferred 
stock, DEBT the short term liabilities and TA the book value of assets. Tobin’s Q is 
determined on a yearly basis per industry and region. Industry classification follows the 
DataStream classification (level 4) analogue to the buyouts in our sample. 
Differentiation between Europe and North America applies. All information is taken 
from the DataStream database. 
The third mean to assess the demand for buyout capital is the social acceptance of 
buyout capital, which has an effect on demand for buyout financing beyond the two 
prior variables. Here the rationale is as follows: Even if owners are interested in selling 
companies and/or the companies’ financing need is high, it is possible that sellers 
simply do not turn to buyout fund managers to sell their companies. In other words it is 
possible that we find no demand for buyout capital simply because the social 
acceptance for buyout capital as a mean of financing is low. In fact, the Private Equity 
industry went through significant changes over the last decades and gained acceptance 
among investors and sellers over this course. The acceptance of and the level of 
professionalism in the buyout industry has increased over this time period with more 
players accepting Private Equity as an asset class (Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003). 
To operationalize this effect of the time trend related to the social acceptance of buyout 
financing, we follow the work of Ljungqvist and Richardson (Ljungqvist and 
Richardson, 2003): 
  Time trend = 
year n acquisitio _
1
, scaled to 1981 = 1. 
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Further variables are included in the regression models to control for additional effects. 
A dummy variable is included for buyouts that have been conducted during the time of 
the new economy (1 for buyouts in 1999 and 2000, 0 for all others). This variable 
should control for the idiosyncrasies of this investment period with its increased 
valuation levels. We further control for the potential performance impact of fund size 
and investment size of the respective buyout (in 1995 USD). Both variables have been 
found to influence buyout performance in prior studies.11 Two additional control 
variables are included to capture the effect of differences in the holding period of the 
buyout and for buyouts that have been conducted in the first year of the fund. A longer 
holding period provides the fund managers with more time to implement changes, while 
on the other side it is argued that value is already created by selecting the right company 
before the acquisition. Buyouts during the fund’s vintage year may have some 
particularities as these deals may be used in the marketing efforts of the fund raising. 
The results of our study hold, however, irrespective of the removal of one or several of 
these control variables from our model. 
<<< Insert table 4 >>> 
Descriptive statistics of the theoretical independent variables used in this study are 
given in table 4. 
                                                 
11 Rf. Kaplan and Schoar, 2005 and Gottschalg et al., 2004. 
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5.2 Performance  measurement 
Buyout performance is measured as the total risk-adjusted return to the investors 
through a profitability index (PI). The PI represents the most sophisticated indicator to 
measure buyout performance  and has several advantages over the widely used IRR 
measure (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005).12 Its calculation requires information about the risk 
inherent in the buyout as well as the timing of its cashflows. The PI is defined as the 
ratio of the present value (PV) of all realized proceeds from an investment over the total 
invested capital and can be written as follows: 





PI = . 
The key challenge in the calculation of the PI stems from the need to find the 
appropriate discount rate to calculate the  PVs. Using overall public market returns as a 
the discount rate implicitly assumes that all buyouts carry the same systematic risk (beta 
of 1). This assumption has been frequently questioned (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; 
Gottschalg et al., 2004 and Gottschalg and Groh, 2006). This study aims to more 
accurately capture the operating risk of different buyout investments in the performance 
measure based on a risk-adjustment according to the region and the industry the 
acquired company is operating in. To this end return data on 70 DataStream indexes are 
used as the basis for the calculation of the discount rate in the PI formula. Gottschalg et 
al. follow a similar approach in determining the operating risk-adjusted performance of 
private equity investments (Gottschalg et al., 2004). 
                                                 
12 As a robustness check we replicated the analyses performed in this paper with the IRR as performance measure 
and the results qualitatively confirmed the findings of our study. 
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A PI of 100 indicates that the risk-adjusted return of the buyouts equals the one of a 
comparable stock quoted company. A PI above indicated a positive abnormal return, 
where as a PI below 100 indicated a negative one. The following descriptive statistics 
include only the buyouts with a strictly positive PI; i.e., those 608 buyouts that did not 
file bankruptcy. Bankrupt buyouts will be treated separately in a later section. The 
median PI in the sample is 207. Table 5 contains information on the buyouts in our 
sample by acquisition year. The table contains information about the number of 
buyouts, the invested equity by the PE fund and the minimum, maximum and median 
PI. The last column states significant deviations of the median PI by acquisition year 
(measured by a t-test and indicated by *). Differences exist in the years 1990/1991, 
1993/1994, 1996 as well as 1999/2000. These differences are only descriptive in kind 
and their origins, including the hypothesized impact of supply and demand for buyout 
capital, will be later assessed in the econometric analyses. 
>>> insert table 5 <<< 
Table 6 and 7 follow the same structure as table 5, but report average performance 
according to industry and country of the buyout respectively. Buyouts in the industries 
resources, non-cyclical consumer goods and services as well as financial institutions 
show significant deviation from the mean (p < 10%). Deviations for countries or regions 
are not identified with the sole exception of French buyouts. The small number of 
French buyouts in the sample needs to be kept in mind, however.  
>>> Insert table 6 <<< 
>>> Insert table 7 <<< 
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5.3  Basic econometric results 
The impact of supply and demand on buyouts has to be expected to be different 
depending on whether buyouts are successfully divested or completely written off.  On 
the one hand, abnormally high acquisition prices increase ceteris paribus the risk of 
insolvency as they require high levels of debt service payments for a given level of 
fundamental performance. Hence supply and demand should have an influence on the 
likelihood of bankruptcy. For successful (i.e. non-bankrupt) buyouts, on the other hand, 
supply and demand influence the acquisition price and thereby the performance of the 
transaction. As the bankruptcy events (with PI = 0) cannot necessarily be seen as a 
continuation of the assumed linear relationship between supply and demand on the one 
hand and performance of the other, the analysis will be carried out separately for 
buyouts, which filed bankruptcy during the holding period. We first focus therefore on 
the 608 buyouts in our sample that did not go bankrupt and then specifically look at the 
determinants of bankruptcy in a separate analysis. 
Non-Bankrupt Buyouts  
To assess the impact of supply of and demand for buyout funding on the performance of 
the 608 non-bankrupt buyouts, we use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with 
White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The dependant variable is the log of 
PI and the independent variables are the capital overhang to proxy supply and M&A 
volume, Tobin Q and time trend to proxy demand. In addition, we control for the 
impact of fund size and buyout size, the holding period and acquisitions during the time 
of the new economy or in the first fund year through control variables. We applied OLS 
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regression due to its ease of application and robustness (Cohen et al., 2002). The 
corresponding equation of the OLS regression reads as follows: 
PIn = α  + β1 * Capital Overhangn + β2 * M&A Volumen + β3 * Tobin-Qn +  
      β4 *  Time Trendn + β5 * New Economyn +  β6 * Fund Sizen +  
      β7 * Buyout Sizen + β8 * Holding Periodn + β9 * First Fund Yearn + error terms ε n
Table 8 shows the results of the regression analysis. The left column shows the 
variables followed by expected sign of the coefficient. The right column shows 
standardized correlation coefficients and below (in brackets) White heteroscedasticity 
consistent standard errors. The significance of the correlation coefficients is shown as 
‘*’ with *** representing 1% significance level (two-sided), ** 5% and * 10%. The 
bottom of the table shows various model specification and diagnosis tests. 
>>> Insert table 8 <<< 
The results of table 8 can be summarized as follows: 
•  Supply of buyout capital: The effect of the analyzed variable on buyout 
performance is highly significant and negative (p < 1%). This is consistent with 
the prediction that an increase in the available buyout capital leads to an increase 
in acquisition prices and thus to a lower return to the shareholders. This effect is 
also of great economic significance as an increase of 1% in the capital overhang 
leads to a decrease of the PI by 0.4%. 
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•  Demand of buyout capital: All three analyzed variables are significant with the 
expected sign (p < 1% for M&A volume and Tobin-Q; p < 5% for time trend). 
An increase in M&A activity, an increase of companies' need for financing and 
higher acceptance of buyouts all lead to significantly higher buyout performance 
which is consistent with the prediction that greater demand for buyout capital 
lowers acquisition prices (p < 1%). 
It can be concluded that our results confirm the hypothesized negative relationship 
between supply of buyout financing and buyout performance and the hypothesized 
positive relationship between the demand for buyout financing and buyout performance, 
as all coefficients have the expected sign and are statistically significant in their impact 
on buyout performance. This finding is in line with the related study by Gompers and 
Lerner who document the existence of the “money chasing deal” effect on the pricing of 
venture capital participations (Gompers and Lerner, 2000). 
Model fit and diagnosis tests are reported at the end of table 8. The only violation of the 
regression assumptions are that residuals are not normally distributed. This does not 
harm the validity of the model as the sample size is large. However, to further elaborate 
this issue a bootstrapping analysis shall be conducted to further validate the results.13 
An R
2 of 5.7% for the overall model also makes intuitive sense. It shows the relevance 
of the price pressure effect as a determinant of buyout performance. On the other hand 
intuitively one would not expect the level of competition for buyout investments to 
explain much more than 5 to 10 percent of the overall variation in buyout performance. 
                                                 
13 Rf. appendix 
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After all, our model does not include any measures of other important variables such as 
the structure of the deal or any initiatives taken to restructure the company after its 
acquisition. 
Determinants of Bankruptcy 
We can then shift our focus to the question of whether supply of and demand for buyout 
financing influence the likelihood of buyouts going bankrupt. To address this question, 
we perform a logistic regression analysis (maximum-likelihood logit estimation with 
White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors). A dummy variable (1 for bankrupt 
buyouts) is created and used as the dependant variable. The independent variables 
remain as before. Table 9 shows the results of the analysis in the same format as table 8. 
>>> Insert table 9 <<< 
The results show that supply of and demand for buyout capital does not significantly 
affect the likelihood of buyout bankruptcy. It is noteworthy, however, that large funds 
seem to be more likely to invest in buyouts that eventually go bankrupt. A possible 
explanation of this effect is that smaller funds are more risk averse and avoid investing 
in buyout companies with a high likelihood of failure. Another interesting though 
intuitive finding is that a longer holding period increases the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
In fact this result may well be the manifestation of the inverse causality. If a buyout 
goes bankrupt, the buyout fund manager has incentives to wait as long as possible until 
she reports the bad news.  
Differences between Europe and North America 
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European and North American buyouts have different structures and different 
maturity.14 In the following, we analyze structural differences in the effect of the supply 
for and the demand of buyout financing between transactions in North America and 
Europe. To this end, the sample is divided into these two regions. The same regression 
model is used as in prior analyses. Table 10 shows the results. 
>>> Insert table 10 <<< 
The results for Europe and North America overall support the price pressure effect 
hypothesis. However, there appear to be some significant differences between the two 
sub-samples with respect to the nature of the price pressure effect 
The most important difference is that for North American buyouts the supply of buyout 
capital (the "money chasing deals" phenomenon) is not statistically significant. For 
European buyouts, however, this capital supply effect is significant (p < 5%). On the 
capital demand side, we also see important differences. The performance effect of 
M&A activity is positive and statistically significant (p < 1%) for European as well as 
North American buyouts. For European companies no impact of demand caused by 
need for internal financing (as measured though Tobin’s Q) was identified, while this 
effect is significant and positive (p < 5%) for North American Buyouts. 
A look at the control variables indicates that buyouts executed during the time of the 
new economy performed worse in Europe (p < 1%), but no significant differences could 
                                                 
14 Rf. Desbrières and Schatt, 2002 for an exhaustive discussion. 
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be identified for North American buyouts. Moreover buyouts in the first fund vintage 
year were only performing better in North America (p < 10%). Overall it is interesting 
to see that the explanatory power of our model is much larger for the European 
subsample (R
2 of 10%) than for the sample of North American Buyouts (R
2 of 5.4%). 
6 Conclusion 
It was the objective of this paper to analyze whether or not differences in the supply of 
and the demand for private equity financing have a significant influence on the 
performance of buyouts. We thereby assess whether the market for buyout financing 
can be considered “efficient” in the sense of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 
1970) or whether price pressure effects (Scholes, 1972) exist as suggested by behavioral 
finance theory. The latter predicts acquisition prices (and thereby transaction 
performance) to depend on the supply of and the demand for buyout capital. 
To test this hypothesis, we modeled risk-adjusted buyout performance as determined by 
three proxies for the demand for capital for buyout transactions and by one proxy for 
the supply of buyout capital. We further control for the impact of (a) fund and 
investment size, (b) holding period, (c) particularities of transactions made during the 
time of the “new economy” boom and (d) the particularities of deals made in the first 
year of a fund’s life. The results of our analysis provide general support for the 
existence of price pressure effects in the buyout market, as the supply of buyout funding 
has a significant and negative impact on risk-adjusted buyout performance and the 
demand for buyout funding have a significant and positive impact on risk-adjusted 
buyout performance. Hence we find evidence for the presence of a “money chasing 
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deals” phenomenon (Gompers and Lerner, 2000), as well as of the corresponding effect 
of “deals chasing money”.  
These findings are robust to different operationalizations of our independent variables 
and remain qualitatively unchanged if we include additional control variables to capture 
the effect of (a) idiosyncratic characteristics of individual investment periods, (b) the 
industry sector of individual investments and (c) the age of the investing private equity 
fund. It is further noteworthy that US buyouts are not as much influenced by changes in 
supply as their European counterparts. This is consistent with the notion that the North 
American buyout market is more efficient than the European market. 
Our results support the view that the market for buyout target companies is not 
necessarily efficient, but that acquisition prices (and thereby transaction performance) 
depend on the competition by a limited number of private equity fund managers for a 
limited number of attractive investment opportunities. This is consistent with the 
findings by numerous other empirical studies that found evidence for the existence of 
price pressure effects in other markets.15
Our results have also important implications for practitioners. If capital supply is indeed 
negatively related to buyout performance, the increasing capital overhang in recent 
years may be one factor that contributes to a falling average performance of this asset 
class. As capital commitments into buyout funds currently rise towards new peaks, 
                                                 
15 For public companies rf. for example Shleifer, 2000; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002; Harris and Gurel, 1986; 
Shleifer, 1986; Dhillon and Johnson, 1991; Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997 and Goetzmann, 1986; for private compa-
nies rf. Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Gompers and Lerner, 2004 and Kaplan and Stein, 1993. 
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Appendix 
 
Additional Robustness Checks 
In order to assess the validity of the regression model this section contains several 
robustness tests. As indicated in chapter 5.3 (table 8), the assumption of normally 
distributed residuals is violated for this model. This is not expected to impact the 
validity of the results because of the large sample size. To gain further confidence in our 
findings, a boot-strapping analysis is conducted to assess validity.16 The bootstrap 
confidence intervals for the regression coefficients are displayed in table 11. The 
coefficient is significant if the derived interval does not include 0. 
The results of the bootstrapping analysis support the results shown in chapter 5.3. This 
insight applies for all variables of the initial analysis and further supports the 
importance of supply and demand effects on buyout performance. 
>>> Insert table 11 <<< 
As a second test for robustness of the discussed results, a robust regression is 
conducted. Large residuals can influence the efficiency of the OLS results. The robust 
regression method provides more efficient results in case of influential outliers in the 
sample. The applied robust regression represents the iteratively weighted least squares 
method, which gives lower weight to large residual values.17
                                                 
16 For a technical description of the bootstrapping method rf. Hall, 1994. 
17 For an exhaustive description of the method rf. Huber, 1981. 
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<<< Insert table 12 >>> 
The results of the robust regression (rf. table 12) further support the prior results. The 
only difference is that the holding period is now significant (p < 1%). The longer the 
buyout fund has the buyout in its portfolio, the lower their return is. This supports the 
argument that buyout funds are able to improve the company value in the short-term to 
maximize value for the investors. It can be concluded that the presented results are 
robust to various different statistical methods. 
To further verify the sensitivity of our results to the effect of additional fund, 
investment or industry characteristics, we conducted three additional robustness checks. 
In these we added three sets of control variables to our OLS regression model.  In the 
first model (table 13), we added dummy variables for eight industry categories 
according to DataStream. Our analysis shows that the findings regarding the price 
pressure effect are qualitatively unchanged. Only one of the industry dummy variables 
is statistically significant, indicating that buyouts in the sector of non-cyclical services 
have ceteris paribus significantly underperformed in our sample. Similarly, we added 
dummy variables to control for performance differences among buyouts that have been 
entered during different years of the fund age (table 14). Here again the findings 
regarding the price pressure effects are qualitatively unchanged and none of the 
additional control variables has a significant influence on buyout performance. Finally, 
we added control variables for the effect of different investment periods, with a dummy 
variable for investments made prior to 1990 and post 1995 (table 15). As these variables 
are by design highly correlated with the variable “Time Trend”, the VIF in the full 
model increased substantially (table 15 column 1). We hence removed the variable 
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“Time Trend” from the model (table 15 column 2) and found the dummy variable for 
post 1995 deals to have a significant and positive impact on buyout performance, which 
suggest that transactions in the second half of the 1990s performed better. Again, our 
findings regarding the price pressure effects did not change qualitatively in either of 
these specifications of our model. 
<<< Insert table 13 >>> 
<<< Insert table 14 >>>  
<<< Insert table 15 >>>
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Overview of tables 
 
Table 1 Overview of funds 
Investment
focus Number Percent Average Median Min Max Total Percent
Europe 39 23% 538 235 31 5,655 20,963 29%
North America 131 77% 388 200 5 3,750 50,801 71%
Total 170 100% 422 200 5 5,655 71,764 100%
Funds Committed fund volume (million USD)
 
Table 2 Overview buyouts 
Region of
buyouts Number Percent Average Median Min Max Total Percent
Europe 170 25% 25 11 0 535 4,200 26%
North America 514 75% 23 12 0 350 11,808 74%
Total 684 100% 23 11 0 535 16,008 100%
Buyouts Equity invested (million USD)
 
Table 3 Buyouts per industry 
Industry Number Percent Average Median Min Max Total Percent
Resources 18 3% 15 10 0 50 262 2%
Basic material 69 10% 23 11 0 535 2,059 13%
General industries 23 3% 16 9 1 65 370 2%
Consumer goods (cyclical) 73 11% 30 13 0 342 1,430 9%
Consumer goods (non-cyclical) 97 14% 18 9 1 172 1,750 11%
Services (cyclical) 208 30% 24 16 0 107 5,002 31%
Services (non-cyclical) 28 4% 29 20 2 123 811 5%
Information technology 127 19% 22 8 0 535 2,745 17%
Financial institutions 41 6% 39 10 0 350 1,579 10%
Total 684 100% 23 11 0 535 16,008 100%
Equity invested (million USD) Buyouts
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
Min Max Average Median
Supply of buyout capital
Capital overhang (available capital for fund managers) 6,5 11,5 10,0 10,1
Demand for buyout capital
M&A volume 23,392,000,000 728,334,000,000 177,159,000 130,391,000
Tobin-Q 0,2 73,1 1,7 1,2
Time trend 0,994 0,999 0,997 0,996
Control variables
New economy 0 1 0,09 0
Fund size 9 5,455 455 239
Buyout size 0 350 22 11
Holding period 0 16 3,5 3
First fund year 0 1 0,09 0  
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Table 5 Profitability index by acquisition year 
Acquisition year # Buyouts
Invested capital 
(USD millions) Min Max Median
1984 7 19 91 368,165 185
1985 8 60 12 776 217 *
1986 17 204 162 72,955 427
1987 4 81 111 230 144 **
1988 23 680 9 4,147 297
1989 14 476 50 3,966 180
1990 22 699 11 851 167 *
1991 36 660 13 1,168 222 *
1992 42 659 3 4,498 179
1993 59 992 13 1,612 204 *
1994 56 1,056 9 1,281 132 *
1995 64 1,582 23 210,244 153
1996 69 1,667 24 2,657 163 *
1997 84 2,021 3 37,014 239
1998 44 725 57 9,925 265
1999 33 753 47 1,143 256 *
2000 19 706 45 2,151 227 *
2001 4 176 232 790 361
2002 2 68 329 577 453
2003 1 6 282 282 282
Total 608 13,290 3 368,165 207
Profitability index Significantly 
different from 
mean
n.b. deviation from mean based on the respective sub sample in comparison to the remaining sample based on a 
t tests; level of significance: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%  
Table 6 Profitability index by industry 
Industry # Buyouts
Invested capital 
(USD millions) Min Max Median
Resources 16 261 23 1,666 163 *
Basic materials 60 1,678 3 1,873 240
General industries 23 362 12 9,898 262
Consumer goods (cyclical) 65 1,159 9 5,629 207
Consumer goods (non cyclical) 91 1,515 33 2,667 204 *
Services (cyclical) 189 4,296 9 210,245 206
Services (non cyclical) 24 708 11 732 148 *
Information technology 102 1,827 3 368,165 225
Financial institutions 38 1,484 5 1,077 227 *
Total 608 13,290 3 368,165 207
n.b. deviation from mean based on the respective sub sample in comparison to the remaining sample based on a 
t tests; level of significance: *** 1% ** 5% * 10%




Table 7 Profitability index by region 
Country # Buyouts
Invested capital 
(USD millions) Min Max Median
Europe 157 3,572 3 37,014 255
United Kingdom 77 1,569 13 6,237 227
Germany 25 619 35 37,014 350
France 18 450 25 982 275 *
Sweden 9 234 113 1,281 329
Others 28 700 3 5,149 224
North America 451 9,718 3 368,165 194
USA 443 9,530 3 368,165 193
Others 8 188 5 1,818 270
Total 608 13,290 3 368,165 207
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Table 8 Results OLS regression: Applied OLS regression uses White heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors. The table shows standardized coefficients with t-values in brackets. Significance level 
(two-sided) for the coefficients is illustrated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
Expected sign PROF_DS4
Supply of buyout capital
Capital overhang (available capital for fund managers) - -0.393***
  (-3.60)
Demand for buyout capital























Durbin-Watson d statistics 1.743
Bera-Jarque test (Chi
2-value) 826.9***
Shapiro-Wilk test (z-value) 7.948***
Akaike information criterium 2.810
Schwarz information criterium 21.912
Maximal VIF 5.24
Average VIF 2.50  
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Table 9 Results of logistic regression: Applied maximum-likelihood logit estimation uses White hetero-
scedasticity consistent standard errors. The table shows standardized coefficients with z-values in brack-
ets. Significance level (two-sided) for the coefficients is illustrated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
Expected sign PROF_DS4
Supply of buyout capital
Capital overhang (available capital for fund managers) - -0.353
  (-1.06)
Demand for buyout capital






















Durbin-Watson d statistics 1.991
Bera-Jarque test (Chi
2-value) 826.9***
Shapiro-Wilk test (z-value) 13.291***
Akaike information criterium 0.668
Schwarz information criterium 18.340  
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Table 10 Regression results Europe and North America: Applied OLS regression uses White hetero-
scedasticity consistent standard errors. The sample was split into buyouts conducted in North America 
and buyout in Europe. The table shows standardized coefficients with t-values in brackets. Significance 
level (two-sided) for the coefficients is illustrated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
Europe North America
Expected sign PROF_DS4 PROF_DS4
Supply of buyout capital
Capital overhang (available capital for fund managers) - -0.374** -0.233
  (-2.28) (-1.28)
Demand for buyout capital
M&A volume + 0.423*** 0.210***
  (3.13) (2.57)
Tobin-Q + 0.062 0.123**
  (1.04) (2.22)
Time trend - -0.114 -0.009
  (-0.79) (-0.06)
Control variables
New economy -0.295*** -0.025***
  (-2.74) (-0.50)
Fund size -0.159 -0.024
  (-1.43) (-0.61)
Buyout size 0.231 -0.013
  (1.21) (-0.22)
Holding period -0.024 -0.014
  (-0.26) (-0.11)








Durbin-Watson d statistics 0.865 1.46
Bera-Jarque test (Chi
2-value) 53*** 1061***
Shapiro-Wilk test (z-value) 3.398*** 7.776***
Akaike information criterium 2.854 2.824
Schwarz information criterium 29.014 29.877
Maximal VIF 5.03 8.35
Average VIF 2.83 2.98  
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Table 11 Results of regression with bootstrap confidence intervals: Applied OLS regression uses 
bootstrap confidence intervals. The table shows standardized coefficients with t-values in brackets. The 
bootstrap confidence intervals for the regression coefficients are displayed in brackets. The coefficient is 
assumed significant if the derived interval does not include 0. This is illustrated by *** (1%), ** (5%) 
and * (10%). 
Expected sign PROF_DS4
Supply of buyout capital 1% level 5% level 10% level
Capital overhang (available capital for fund managers) - -0.393***
  [-0.67,-0.10] [-0.61,-0.18] [-0.56,-0.21]
Demand for buyout capital
M&A volume + 0.214***
  [0.03,0.40] [0.07,0.35] [0.09, 0.35]
Tobin-Q + 0.082*
  [-0.07,0.43] [0.00,0.31] [0.01,0.25]
Time trend - -0.201***
  [-0.46,-0.01] [-0.38,-0.05] [-0.34,-0.06]
Control variables
New economy -0.038
  [-0.14,0.07] [-0.11,0.05] [-0.10,0.03]
Fund size -0.038
  [-0.13,0.05] [-0.11,0.04] [-0.10,0.03]
Buyout size 0.020
  [-0.20,0.18] [-0.11,0.13] [-0.09,0.12]
Holding period -0.009
  [-0.22,0.24] [-0.19,0.18] [-0.16,0.14]
First fund year 0.061
[-0.04,0.15] [-0.01,0.14] [0.00,0.12]  
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Table 12 Results robust regression: Applied robust regression represents the iteratively weighted least 
squares method, which gives lower weight to large residual values. The table shows standardized coeffi-
cients with t-values in brackets. Significance level (two-sided) for the coefficients is illustrated by *** 
(1%), ** (5%) and * (10%).  
Expected sign PROF_DS4
Supply of buyout capital
Capital overhang (available capital for fund managers) - -0.217***
  (-2.88)
Demand for buyout capital















First fund year 0.065*
(1.96)
N 608
F 4.20***  
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Table 13 OLS regression with industry dummies: Applied OLS regression uses White heteroscedastic-
ity consistent standard errors. The table shows standardized coefficients with t-values in brackets. Sig-
nificance level (two-sided) for the coefficients is illustrated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
Expected sign PROF_DS4
Supply of buyout capital
Capital overhang (available capital for fund managers) - -0.397***
  (-3.48)
Demand for buyout capital








































Durbin-Watson d statistics 1.726
Bera-Jarque test (Chi
2-value) 881.2***
Shapiro-Wilk test (z-value) 8.026***
Akaike information criterium 2.827
Schwarz information criterium 65.134
Maximal VIF 5.31
Average VIF 2.09  
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Table 14 OLS regression with fund age dummies: Applied OLS regression uses White heteroscedas-
ticity consistent standard errors. The table shows standardized coefficients with t-values in brackets. 
Significance level (two-sided) for the coefficients is illustrated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
Expected sign PROF_DS4
Supply of buyout capital
Capital overhang (available capital for fund managers) - -0.392***
  (-3.55)
Demand for buyout capital
















First fund year 0.087*
(1.82)
Second fund year 0.018
(0.37)
Third fund year
Fourth fund year 0.023
(0.51)
Fifth fund year 0.064
(1.47)
Sixth fund year 0.035
(0.97)








Durbin-Watson d statistics 1.728
Bera-Jarque test (Chi
2-value) 803.5***
Shapiro-Wilk test (z-value) 7.929***
Akaike information criterium 2.825
Schwarz information criterium 50.930
Maximal VIF 5.29
Average VIF 1.97  
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Table 15 OLS regression with investment period dummies: Applied OLS regression uses White het-
eroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The table shows standardized coefficients with t-values in 
brackets. Significance level (two-sided) for the coefficients is illustrated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * 
(10%). 
Expected sign PROF_DS4 PROF_DS4
Supply of buyout capital
Capital overhang (available capital for fund managers) - -0.392*** -0.272***
  (-3.73) (-3.01)
Demand for buyout capital
M&A volume + 0.157** 0.121*
  (2.14) (1.68)
Tobin-Q + 0.076*** 0.083***
  (3.50) (4.16)
Time trend - -0.295**
  (-2.10)
Control variables
New economy -0.044 0.002
  (-1.01) (0.06)
Fund size -0.030 -0.029
  (-0.82) (-0.81)
Buyout size 0.005 0.007
  (0.08) (0.11)
Holding period -0.010 -0.020
  (-0.11) (-0.22)
First fund year 0.055 0.056
(1.44) (1.48)
Buyout year
1990 and before 0.135* 0.018
(1.72) (0.33)








Durbin-Watson d statistics 1.748 1.750
Bera-Jarque test (Chi
2-value) 841.6*** 860.7***
Shapiro-Wilk test (z-value) 7.961*** 8.009***
Akaike information criterium 2.808 2.811
Schwarz information criterium 29.372 26.994
Maximal VIF 13.72 3.44
Average VIF 3.53 1.84   
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